Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) overrides Tor anonymization.
The whole article can be read here: https://www.tagesschau.de/investigativ/ ... k-100.html
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The Tor network is considered the most important tool for moving anonymously on the Internet. Authorities have begun to infiltrate it in order to expose criminals. They have been successful in at least one case.
Law enforcement authorities in Germany have servers in the Tor network monitored, sometimes for months, in order to deanonymize Tor users. Sites on the so-called darknet are particularly affected. This is revealed by research conducted by the ARD political magazine Panorama and STRG_F (funk/NDR).
The data obtained during the surveillance is processed using statistical methods in such a way that Tor anonymity is completely undermined. Reporters from Panorama and STRG_F were able to view documents showing four successful measures in just one investigation. These are the world's first documented cases of these so-called “timing analyses”. Until now, this was considered virtually impossible. […]
The logic behind the measure, which experts call “timing analysis”: The more nodes in the Tor network are monitored by authorities, the more likely it is that a user will attempt to disguise their connection via one of the monitored nodes. The timing of individual data packets allows anonymized connections to be traced back to the Tor user, even though data connections in the Tor network are encrypted multiple times.
According to research by Panorama and STRG_F, the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) and the Public Prosecutor General's Office in Frankfurt am Main were successful with this method: in the investigation into the paedocriminal darknet platform “Boystown”, they succeeded several times in identifying Tor nodes that were used by one of the people behind the operation to anonymize themselves.
For example, the BKA twice investigated Tor nodes used by platforms operated by the then “Boystown” administrator Andreas G. to connect to the Tor network. This involved, for example, a chat in which leading members of various pedocriminal forums exchanged information. On two occasions, it was also possible to identify so-called “entry servers” from the chat service “Ricochet”, which G. used - it was a breakthrough for the BKA. For the final identification, the district court of Frankfurt am Main finally ordered the provider Telefónica to find out from all o2 customers which of them connected to one of the identified Tor nodes. […]
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Federal Criminal Police Office overrides Tor anonymization (tagesschau.de)
Re: Federal Criminal Police Office overrides Tor anonymization (tagesschau.de)
https://www.reddit.com/r/i2p/comments/1 ... ally_work/ »Would the Tor de-anonymization theoratically work on I2P?«I recently read the news and saw that German authorities managed to de-anonymize some Tor users through time analysis attacks. Would this work with I2P as well? In theory, of course. I don't think it would be very convenient. What do you think?